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War For Sale! Battlefield Contractors in
Latin America & the 'Corporatization'
of America's War on Drugs
Kristen McCallion*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Pentagon's efforts to increase efficiency by utilizing
troops for purely military missions, combined with the incredible
technological development in aircraft and military equipment,
have resulted in a largely accepted, yet hardly understood phe-
nomenon - the outsourcing of military work to private military
companies. Private military companies ("PMCs") are business
organizations which provide professional services inexorably
linked to warfare.1 PMCs deliver military services, conduct mili-
tary and combat training, provide security services, and supply
technical expertise and intelligence to the United States govern-
ment all over the world. The global business of PMCs is thriving,
but to what extent we do not exactly know.
What we do know however, is that today, privatized military
contracting is indeed a lucrative business. It is estimated that
PMCs generate at least $100 billion in revenue annually from the
U.S. government. 2 In fact, many of these private military compa-
* Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2005, University of Miami School of Law. I
would like to thank my parents, Loretta and Joseph McCallion, for their endless
support of all my endeavors, particularly, law school. I would also like to thank my
advisor, Professor Ricardo J. Bascuas for his guidance, criticism and perspective
regarding this comment, as well as former Senator Bob Barr, the Sundance Channel
and lastly, Edwin Deneen, whose "guidelines" always keep me on the right track.
This comment is dedicated to the families of the contractors held hostage in Colombia.
May awareness create a path to reparation.
1. The companies that comprise the privatized military industry are referred to
as private military companies ("PMCs") or private military firms ("PMFs").
Additionally, author and Brookings Institute scholar P.W. Singer organizes the
privatized military industry into three sectors: "military provider firms, military
consultant firms, and military support firms." PETER W. SINGER, CORPORATE
WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY 91 (2003). According to
Singer, a military consulting firm "provide [s] advisory and training services integral
to the operation and restructuring of a client's armed forces" by offering "strategic,
operational, and/or organizational analysis." Id. at 95. For the purposes of this
Comment, the term 'PMCs' encompasses all of these sectors.
2. See Interview by Multinational Monitor with Peter W. Singer, The Privatized
Military: The Unmonitored, Unregulated and Unchecked Global Growth of Private
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:2 & 3
nies ranked in the 2004 Fortune Global 500 List.3 A leading con-
tractor exemplifying the camaraderie between PMCs and the
current Bush Administration is Kellogg Brown & Root, a unit of
Vice President Richard Cheney's oil powerhouse Halliburton,
which was awarded a $16 million contract for constructing the
military prison at Guantanamo Bay.4 Despite these high-priced
contracts, government officials maintain that privatization saves
taxpayers money, yet this claim is still up for debate.5 Addition-
ally, the U.S. Department of State asserts that PMCs, such as
Arlington-based Military Professional Resources Incorporated
("MPRI"), are capable of providing advanced training more effec-
tively and at a lower cost than the United States Army. As a
result, the Pentagon compensates PMCs with more than $4 billion
a year for training American troops alone.6
In addition to training, civilian contractors, as PMC employ-
ees, act as technical experts for sophisticated weaponry, and are
stationed on or near battlefields to be available for emergency
repairs and maintenance.7 In some instances, contractors identify
potential enemy targets in a combat zone, as well as rescue and
salvage downed aircraft. As a result, contractors have become
heavily involved in overseas conflicts.'
Today, civilian contractors battle Colombian guerilla rebel
groups, man armed helicopters, and train the Colombian Army.
Their employment, commenced as assistance to aid the United
States in its 'War on Drugs,' has grown out of proportion to what
their original contracts provided. As a result, critics have charac-
Military Firms, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Mar. 1, 2004, available at 2004 WL
76991271.
3. Northrop Grumman ranked # 155, Halliburton ranked # 322 and Computer
Sciences Corporation ("CSC") ranked # 366. The Fortune Global Five Hundred -
World's Largest Corporations, FORTUNE, July 26, 2004, at 163.
4. See Carol Rosenberg, Building of Prison at Guantanamo Begins, MIAMI
HERALD (Feb. 28, 2002), available at www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/world/
cuba/2760497.htm.
5. See Deborah Avant, Mercenaries, FOREIGN POL'Y, July 1, 2004, available at
2004 WL 63562921.
6. See SINGER, supra note 1, at 67.
7. See Earle Eldridge, Civilians Put Expertise on the Front Line; Thousands
Serve Their Country in War on Terror, USA TODAY, Dec. 5, 2001, available at 2001
WL 5477882.
8. See id. A DynCorp employee, who oversaw aircraft maintenance in the Gulf
War stated, "'We were well aware of the biological threat and the threat from Scud
missiles . .. '[w]e were stationed about a mile from enemy lines, but sometimes we
had to go in to retrieve downed aircraft. It was a little scary.'" Id. Additionally, a
civilian worker admitted to signing "'paperwork saying they are emergency essential
and that they may be subject to combat hostilities.'" Id.
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terized U.S. activity in Colombia "as a small, undeclared war[.]" 9
As civilian contractors perform virtually every function essen-
tial to a successful military operation, it comes as no surprise that
they have been characterized as modern day mercenaries. The
overwhelming number of civilian contractors, ° combined with the
sheer breadth of military operations in which they are engaged,
results in a distortion of the boundary between military and civil-
ian roles. Additionally, the employment of civilian contractors by
the government raises issues regarding government liability,
responsibility, and deniability for civilian action, as Congressional
troop cap mandates are circumvented and profit maximizing pro-
cedures are implemented to the detriment of these civilian
warfighters.
This Comment argues that the current status of government
accountability is merely 'plausible deniability.' Plausible
deniability has become an accepted stance as PMCs act as third
parties whose presence justifies the government's denial of direct
participation. Section II of this Comment explains the current
war in Latin America and the United States' involvement under
the Andean Regional Initiative. This section focuses on Colombia,
where narcotics and guerilla organizations dominate the jungles
in which civilian contractors are engaged in warfare. Section III
of this Comment identifies the most active PMCs in Latin
America. This section provides a description of PMC capabilities
and examines a selection of the vast responsibilities PMCs have
undertaken for the government in the United States and abroad.
Section IV of this Comment describes Congressional budget
approvals and corresponding mandates, like the military troop
cap, which have been implemented in accord with the escalating
privatized war in Latin America. This section depicts the tactics
utilized to circumvent this troop cap, the resulting lack of public
oversight over civilian contractors and the detrimental affects of
PMC profit maximization. Section IV also illustrates the secrecy
surrounding PMC contracts and provides an analysis of the conse-
quences of plausible deniability and the diverging goals between
the government and PMCs. Section V concludes.
9. Ian Traynor, The Privatization of War, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 10, 2003, available
at 2003 WL 64378449.
10. It is estimated that the Pentagon employs over 700,000 private contractors
stationed all over the globe. See Greg Guma, Outside View: Privatizing War, UNITED
PRESS INT'L (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.veteransforpeace.org/Outside-
view privatizing_070804.htm.
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II. AMERICA'S WAR ON DRUGS - PLAN COLOMBIA
AND THE ANDEAN REGIONAL INITIATIVE
Both the Clinton and Bush Administrations have hired PMCs
to diminish coca crops in Latin American countries, particularly in
the Andean Region. PMCs such as DynCorp, MPRI, and Northrop
Grumman receive over $1 billion a year to fly fumigation spray
planes to eradicate coca fields in Colombia and monitor drug traf-
fickers from remote radar sites.11
The United States has supported Colombia's efforts to reduce
narcotics trafficking since the 1970s. 12 Plan Colombia, however,
established in 1999, spurred the heavy military presence the
United States maintains today. Plan Colombia was implemented
by Colombia's former President Andrds Pastrana, to address the
detrimental affects of increasing drug crop cultivation in Colom-
bia. The Clinton Administration deemed Plan Colombia's imple-
mentation as vital to deter Colombia's guerilla warfare, organized
crime, narcotics trafficking, and undemocratic lawlessness from
becoming a serious threat to the United States.13 To support Plan
Colombia, Congress approved a $1.3 billion aid package to the
country in 2000, $400 million of which was allotted for helicopters,
military training programs, and additional assistance to the
Colombian Army counter-narcotics brigades.14 Despite these mon-
etary efforts, Colombia continues to provide 90% of the cocaine
entering into the United States today.15
Today, the Andean Regional Initiative ("ARI") is the Bush
11. See SINGER, supra note 1, at 68.
12. See United States Government Accountability Office, Report to the Honorable
Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Caucus on International Narcotics Control, U.S.
Senate, Drug Control: Aviation Program Safety Concerns in Colombia Are Being
Addressed, GAO-04-918 (July 29, 2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d04918.pdf.
13. See Myles Frechette, In Search of the Endgame: A Long-Term Multilateral
Strategy for Colombia, 62 THE NORTH-SOUTH AGENDA PAPERS 3 (2003), available at
http'//www.ciaonet.org/wps/frmO2/frmO2.pdf. Myles Frechette was the U.S.
Ambassador to Colombia from mid-1994 to late 1997. See id.
14. See K. Larry Storrs & Connie Veillette, Andean Regional Initiative (ARI):
FY2003 Supplemental and FY2004 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors,
Congressional Research Service ("CRS") Report for Congress 9 (Aug. 27, 2003),
available at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32021.pdf.
15. See Gabriela Marcella, The United States and Colombia: The Journey from
Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity (May 2003) (this monograph report is part of the
"Shaping the Regional Security Environment in Latin America" series published
jointly by the North-South Center at the University of Miami and the Strategic
Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College), available at http://www.
carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdffiles/00007.pdf.
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regime's continuation of 'Plan Colombia."6 The ARI provides eco-
nomic assistance and military support to seven countries in the
Andean Ridge: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru,
and Venezuela.
The United States is a major trading partner to all countries
included in the ARI. 17 This fact, combined with the social and
political disasters the narcotics industry fosters in the Andean
Ridge, provides support for the strong economic and militaristic
presence the United States maintains in the region.
Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru produce virtually all of the
world's cocaine and 60% of the heroin seized in the United
States. 8 In fact, "Peru is the second largest cocaine producer in
the world . *.".."19 Brazil is not categorized as a drug-producing
country, but acts as a conduit for cocaine from Colombia to the
United States. 0 Brazil implemented "a $1.4 billion sensor and
radar project called the Amazon Vigilance System ("SWAM")" to
monitor and control drug trafficking.2 The country shares this
monitoring data with the United States.22
Venezuela and Ecuador are both major oil producing coun-
tries, members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries ("OPEC"), and supply considerable quantities of oil to the
United States.23 In fact, Venezuela "is now the fourth largest sup-
plier of crude oil to the United States."24 Venezuela, like Brazil,
acts as a major conduit for drug trafficking.25 However, Venezue-
lan President Chavez denounced Plan Colombia, and has denied
the United States any air rights to monitor drug production and
cultivation over Venezuelan territory.26
In 1999, the United States and Ecuador signed a ten year
agreement for a 'forward operating location' ("FOL"), which serves
as a U.S. drug monitoring operation and aerial detection center.27
This was a consequence of Panama's unwillingness "to allow the
16. The ARI expanded Plan Colombia's reach in order to counter spill-over effects
in neighboring countries. See Storrs & Veillette, supra note 14, at 8.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. Id. at 17.
20. See id. at 23.
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 8.
24. Id. at 24.
25. See id. at 25.
26. See id.
27. Id. at 21.
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United States to retain a formal military presence" for drug sur-
veillance within its borders.2" As such, FOLs in Ecuador, El Sal-
vador, and Aruba act as substitute locations for this activity."
In addition to the role that commerce and oil play in elucidat-
ing U.S. involvement in Latin America, the amplified role of civil-
ian contractors in Latin America is due largely to the increased
focus of the Bush Administration on global terrorism as a result of
the September 11 attacks on the United States. Consequently,
the war on drugs in Latin America now encompasses the war on
terrorism as well. Both wars have become intertwined elements
that comprise "narcoterrorism."30 Accordingly, civilian contractors
are engaged in not only anti-drug efforts, but counter-insurgency
and anti-terrorism operations in this region for the United States
government. As a result, civilian contractors who were first con-
tracted to fumigate drug crops are now engaged in battling ter-
rorists in this "small, undeclared war[.]"31
A. Colombia
As it is well known, Colombia has faced decades of turmoil
comprised of political and economical struggles as a result of the
country's narcotics trafficking. Despite decades of U.S. aid,
Colombia continued to be a portrayal of warfare through the
1990s which slowly depicted the fall of the Colombian Army to
guerilla groups, and consequently, the rise of the country as a
drug state.2
While there are a number of Latin American countries
engaged in some form of narcotics trafficking,33 Colombia repre-
28. Id. at 26.
29. See id.
30. "According to the [United States] Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"),
narcoterrorism refers to terrorist acts carried out by groups that are directly or
indirectly involved in cultivating, manufacturing, transporting, or distributing illicit
drugs. The term is generally applied to groups that use the drug trade to fund
terrorism." Council on Foreign Relations, Terrorism: Questions & Answers,
Narcoterrorism, What is Narcoterrorism?, available at http://www.cfrterrorism.org/
terrorism/narcoterrorism.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
31. Traynor, supra note 9, at 2.
32. Colombia currently produces coca, opium poppy, and cannabis, and is the
world's leading coco cultivator. See United States Central Intelligence Agency, CIA -
The World Factbook - Colombia, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/geos/co.html (last modified Jan. 27, 2005).
33. In September 2004, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela were included on
President Bush's 'Majors List' of countries which currently raise concerns over
narcotics. See Robert Charles, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and
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sents the single most significant threat to the United States.
Today, "[tihe United States has ... more troops and civilian con-
tractors . . . in Colombia than ever before."34 Quite simply,
"Colombia is the linchpin in the narcoterrorist battle . . . ." The
magnitude of this threat and the current Administration's empha-
sis on protecting the United States from the Colombian drug war
are major factors affecting the rise of civilian contractors engaged
in operations within Colombia's borders.
1. Colombia's Guerilla Organizations: FARC, ELN,
and AUC
Colombia's biggest detriment is in fact the massive presence
of guerilla groups that rely on the lucrative narcotics industry.
There are approximately 18,000 members in the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia, or Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia ("FARC"), and 4,000 members in the National Liber-
ation Army or Ejfrcito de Liberaci6n Nacional ("ELN"). 6 FARC
and ELN comprise the two largest, active insurgent groups in the
country.37 Furthermore, there are approximately 8,000 members
in a growing right-wing, anti-insurgent, paramilitary organization
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia ("AUC").33 Comprised of at
least seven sub-groups with different agendas, there is continuous
disagreement within the AUC9.3  The organization has colluded
with the Colombian Armed Forces in fighting FARC and ELN, but
has also been accused of human rights abuses and narcotics traf-
ficking. 4° Additionally, it is important to note that not one of these
organizations abides by the laws of humanitarian conduct of war.
Law Enforcement Affairs, Statement on Narcotics Certification: President's FY 2005
Narcotics Certification (Sept. 16, 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/glinl/rls/rm/
36249.htm.
34. United States Institute of Peace, Civil Society Under Siege in Colombia,
Special Report 114, at 2 (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.usip.orgtpubs/special
reports/srll4.pdf
35. Challenges for U.S. Policy Toward Colombia: Is Plan Columbia Working?,
Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. (Oct. 29,
2003) (testimony of General James T. Hill, United States Army, Commander, United
States Southern Command), available at http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/031029
hill.htm.
36. See Council on Foreign Relations, Terrorism: Questions & Answers, FARC,
ELN, AUC: Columbia, Rebels, available at http://www.cfrterrorism.orggroups/farc.
html (last visited Nov. 1, 2004)
37. See United States Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 32.
38. See Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 36.
39. See United States Institute of Peace, supra note 34, at 15.
40. See Storrs & Veillette, supra note 14, at 9.
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Inhumane tactics utilized by the guerillas include kidnapping,
hijacking, assassination, and bribery. The largest target of these
tactics is the Colombian Army,41 however, American civilian con-
tractors fall victim to the inhumanities of Colombia's guerilla
organizations as well.
Former Colombian president Pastrana initiated peace talks
with the country's guerilla groups and even went as far as creat-
ing "a sanctuary area or 'despaje'" for FARC rebels that was off-
limits to the Colombian army.42 This safe haven constituted
approximately 40% of the country's territory,43 which is an area
approximately the size of Switzerland." Unfortunately, the gue-
rilla groups utilized it to plot terrorist attacks and establish drug
camps.45 These peace talks have since been cancelled and the
demilitarized zone is now a battleground.
2. Colombia's President Uribe
In May 2002, the Colombians elected Alvaro Uribe as their
President. The election marked a major political shift in the coun-
try. Colombians acknowledged the fact that Pastrana's peace
efforts with the guerillas proved unsuccessful, and that ulti-
mately, peace would not result from negotiations alone between
the government and Colombia's terrorist organizations.46 Uribe
has implemented many controversial steps to battle the drug war,
including "authoriz[ing] widespread aerial fumigation of coca
crops."47 Additionally, Uribe implemented the 'Soldados Campesi-
nos' (peasant soldiers) program which augmented the Colombian
"armed forces with 'peasant soldiers"' who are based near their
hometowns and "receive less training than regular [soldiers]."48
The program's function is to diminish the vulnerability of towns
41. See Marcella, supra note 15, at 28.
42. Storrs & Veillette, supra note 14, at 9.
43. See Energy Information Administration, United States Department of Energy,
Colombia Country Analysis Brief (July 2004), at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/
colombia.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
44. See Timeline: Colombia - A Chronology of Key Events, BBC NEWS (Jan. 21,
2005), available at httpJ/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/country-profiles/1212827.stm.
45. See Challenges for U.S. Policy Toward Colombia: Is Plan Columbia Working?,
Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, supra note 35, at 4.
46. See Thomas C. Bruneau, Colombia: Conflict and Civil-Military Relations,
STRATEGIC INSIGHTS (March 2003), available at http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mi/si/mar03/
latinAmerica.asp.
47. Storrs & Veillette, supra note 14, at 10.
48. Id.
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that have little or no police or military presence to guerilla
occupation.
Most recently, to combat the insurgent efforts of the Colom-
bian guerilla organizations, President Uribe implemented 'Plan
Patriota.' Plan Patriota represents the most intense phase of mili-
tary involvement thus far, and consequently calls for additional
military and civilian contractor support.49
At first, U.S. involvement in "Colombia was defined only as
counternarcotics support."0 However, the September 11 attacks
prompted the Bush Administration and Congress to view Colom-
bia as not only a haven for narcotics, but a breeding ground for
terrorism.5 Consequently, FARC, ELN, and AUC all appeared on
the U.S. Department of State's terrorist list, and were generally
viewed as sub-parts of a global threat assessment, as they con-
ducted illegal business activities throughout Latin America.52
Obviously, there are many factors which have influenced the
rise of PMC presence in Colombia. The strength of the guerilla
organizations in Colombia, President Uribe's militaristic
approach, and the terrorist attacks of September 11 represent the
more predominant causes. Consequently, America's war on drugs
and war on terrorism have become one and the same in Colom-
bia.53 As civilian contractors work to reduce coca cultivation in the
49. See Memorandum from Washington Office on Latin America to Foreign Policy
and Defense Policy Aides, Retain the Caps in Current Law on the Development of U.S.
Soldiers and Private Contractors in Columbia (May 14, 2004), available at http:fl
www.wola.org/Colombia/troop-cap-memo.htm.
50. Marcella, supra note 15, at 34.
51. See Bruneau, supra note 46.
52. See Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, United
States Department of State, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement: FY 2004
Budget Justification (June 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/rpt/cbj/
fy2004I21880.htm. "The September 11 attacks and their aftermath highlight the
close connections and overlap among terrorists, drug traffickers, and organized crime
groups. The nexus is far reaching. In many instances, such as Colombia, the groups
are the same." Id.; see also Marcella, supra note 15, at 34-35. These groups were
"present in at least 18 countries... and to this day regularly cross borders to conduct
illegal activities in Panama, Ecuador, Venezuela, Peru and Brazil." Id.
53. Ari Fleischer stated, "we have every intention of helping Colombia and
working closely with Colombia. What they face are terrorists. That's most often
associated with drugs, but it's terrorism, nevertheless." Press Gaggle with Ari
Fleischer, White House Press Secretary (Feb. 22, 2003), available at http://www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030222-4.html; see also Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, United States Department of State, supra
note 52. "To deal with the increasing linkage and overlap among terrorist, drug and
crime groups, [the Bureau of International Narcotics and law Enforcement Affairs
("INL")] has begun shifting.., to a broader and more integrated law enforcement
effort to combat the full range of criminal, drug, and terrorist threats." Id.
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Andean Region, they also battle guerilla groups in war-like sur-
roundings alongside the Colombian Army. What was once only a
war on drugs has become full-fledged warfare with American civil-
ian contractors in the middle of a combat zone.
III. PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES
IN LATIN AMERICA
Yet another motivating factor behind the increasing war-like
activity in Colombia can be explained by evaluating the advanced
technological training and skills these PMCs boast. Quite simply,
PMCs are engaged in the art of warfare. PMC employees are
trained military men and women who are compensated for their
involvement in military activities and quite obviously, in order for
PMCs to survive as a business entity, there must be militaristic
activities or programs in which they can engage. An evaluation of
the following PMCs' capabilities is quite impressive, yet it also
obviates the issues which are present today. The incredibly
advanced expertise, combined with the technological capacities
and private nature of these companies create an aura of secrecy
surrounding their contracts with the government. In turn, this
secrecy creates a web of misinformation that effectively reduces
public oversight regarding PMC activities.
A. Dyncorp and Computer Sciences Corporation
Dyncorp was purchased in 2003 by Computer Sciences Corpo-
ration ("CSC"). CSC currently boasts 79,000 employees and $14.8
billion dollars in revenue in 2004.54 CSC's website claims that it
efficiently supplies "everything from paper clips to weapons" to
U.S. troops.55 The company recently contracted a 10 year, $680
million agreement with the U.S. Army to maintain logistics capa-
bilities for the Army Materiel Command ("AMC"), which manages
and supplies weapons systems essential for the preparation of
warfare.5 The company has "served virtually every agency,
department and major initiative in the U.S. government."57
54. See Computer Services Corporation ("CSC"), About Us, available at http:l/
www.csc.com/aboutus/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
55. CSC, Did You Know? Defense, available at http://www.csc.com/aboutus/
didyouknowfactslong.shtml#defense (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
56. See CSC, An Overview of the Army's Logistics Modernization Program,
available at http://www.csc.com/industries/government/mds/mds2/509.shtml (last
visited Nov. 12, 2004).
57. CSC, Representative Federal Sector Clients, available at http://www.csc.com/
industries/government/mds/mds81/123.shtml (last visited October 14, 2004). CSC's
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In fact, CSC proudly claims that since 1959, it has "work[ed]
closely with the U.S. federal government."58 More recently, in the
1990s, DynCorp assisted in the training of the Haitian police force
under President Clinton.59 In 1991, Dyncorp was awarded a $600
million contract to handle aircraft maintenance, pilot and aircrew
training, and crop fumigation and eradication by the Department
of State's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement ("DoS/
INL") program.60 In Colombia, DynCorp shares headquarters
with the U.S. Department of State in BogotA.16 Specifically,
DynCorp provides and trains pilots, mechanics, and other opera-
tions and maintenance personnel to support the Colombian Army
and the Colombian National Police.62 Under this contract, the risk
assessment to DynCorp employees "is considered significant."63
The company also maintains U.S. provided helicopters utilized in
drug eradication missions.6 Additionally, Dyncorp provides fuel
specialists, accountants, secretaries, and drivers to the Colombian
Army and Colombian National Police. 5 In Dyncorp's efforts to
eradicate coca fields in Latin America, "10 employees have been
killed over the last decade."66
B. Military Professional Resources Incorporated
MPRI was incorporated in 1987 by eight retired senior mili-
tary personnel. MPRI's headquarters is in Alexandria, Virginia,
website lists a "representative sampling" of federal sector clients. The sampling lists
thirty departments including the Missile Defense Agency, the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, and the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. See id.
58. CSC, Army Materiel Command (US): Smooth Transition of Government
Employees to CSC Creates a Precedent of Success in Government Outsourcing,
available at http://www.csc.com/industries/government/casestudies/1346.shtml (last
visited Mar. 10, 2005).
59. See Sean Gonsalves, Service with Integrity?, COMMON DREAMS NEWS CENTER
(Dec. 19, 2000), available at http://www.commondreams.orgviews/121900-102.htm.
60. See War Profiteers, DynCorp-State Department Contract (May 23, 2001),
available at http:f / www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=676.
61. DynCorp and the Department of State headquarters are in the El Dorado
Airport in Bogota. See United States Government Accountability Office, supra note
12, at 2.
62. See Secretary of State, United States Department of State, Report to Congress:
Certain Counternarcotics Activities in Colombia (Apr. 14, 2003), available at http://
www.ciponline.org/colombia/03041401.htm.
63. Id.
64. See United States Government Accountability Office, supra note 12, at 3.
65. See Secretary of State, United States Department of State, supra note 62.
66. Bob Cox & Barry Shlachter, Fort Worth, Texas-Based Dyncorp Among Leaders
in Providing Military Security, FORT WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, Sept. 2, 2004, available
at 2004 WL 55719444.
67. See Military Professional Resources Incorporated ("MPRI"), About MPRI -
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conveniently located in close proximity to Washington D.C." The
company currently has 1500 employees worldwide "and manages
programs throughout the United States and in more than twenty
countries overseas."69 According to the MPRI website, the com-
pany "provides comprehensive and integrated programs that
address training, education, leader development, organizational
design and implementation, democracy transition, and emergency
management across a broad spectrum of functional areas."7" In
sum, MPRI acts as a military consulting firm to the U.S. govern-
ment, and, quite honestly, appears to be a private extension of the
United States military.71 An attractive aspect of MPRI's employ-
ment practices is that the company maintains and draws its
workforce from a "carefully managed" database of more than
12,500 former defense and law enforcement professionals.72
Hence, the company hires contractors on an as needed basis. The
vast range of tasks performed by MPRI clearly depicts the confi-
dence in and reliance on the company by the government. This
reliance can best be explained by the fact that MPRI's staff is
exclusively comprised of retired U.S. military, as well as by the
company's guarantee of only working on international contracts
approved by the United States government.73
The immeasurable range of tasks MPRI is assigned to per-
form by the current Administration can be observed merely by
looking on U.S. soil alone. MPRI recruits, completes anti-terror-
ism assessments, implements foreign threat preparations, con-
ducts weapons-related strategic planning, and writes "the U.S.
Army Installation Commander Force Protection Handbook."74
MPRI is also responsible for the operation of military recruiting
programs, commonly referred to as the Reserve Officer Training
Corps ("ROTC") in over 200 American universities, where instruc-
tors wear uniforms, despite being private sector employees.75 As if
the seemingly endless functions the company performs for train-
Taking Expertise Around the World, available at http://www.mpri.comlsite/about.html
(last visited Nov 1, 2004)
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See SINGER, supra note 1, at 119.
72. MPRI, It's What We Do, available at http://www.mpri.com/site/capabili
ties.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2004).
73. See SINGER, supra note 1, at 120.
74. MPRI, Strategic Planning Programs, available at http://www.mpri.com/site/
stratplanprograms.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2004).
75. See SINGER, supra note 1, at 123.
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ing purposes are not enough, MPRI has developed and written two
field manuals for the Army regarding contracting in a battlefield
environment. 6
In fact, contracting in a battlefield environment is an exact
depiction of MPRI's role in Latin America, despite the company
website's vague edict that its sole function in this region is simply
to "provide analytical support and conference/seminar activities
on a periodic basis" 77 to the Center for Hemispheric Defense Stud-
ies ("CHDS").75
In reality, MPRI's participation in Latin America commenced
when the company was hired to devise a plan for the Colombian
government to implement Plan Colombia.79 At first, MPRI was
paid $850,000 for six weeks of assessment work in the initial ana-
lytical stages of Plan Colombia. ° This involvement resulted in the
company's ability to effectively position itself for further participa-
tion in the Colombian drug war. In fact, by 2000, MPRI had
employees stationed full time in Colombia under a $6 million con-
tract. 1 As the contractor's responsibilities responded to the Bush
Administration's expansion of a counter-narcotics campaign to a
counter-terrorism campaign, MPRI worked with Colombian
armed forces and national police to implement counter-guerilla
effective procedures. 2 Despite MPRI's deep presence in and
among Colombian forces, the company's contract was prematurely
terminated only one year later due to the dissatisfaction expressed
76. According to the MPRI, the field manuals "established a doctrinal basis
directed toward acquiring and managing contractors as an additional resource in
support of the full range of military operations." MPRI, Military Joint & Service
Doctrine Development Program, available at http://www.mpri.com/site/nat-jointdoc
dev.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2004).
77. MPRI, Latin America, available at http://www.mpri.com/site/int-samerica.
html (last visited Oct. 9, 2004).
78. See id. The Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies ("CHDS") is a result of
Latin American military defense officials from revitalized democratic countries who
expressed concern over the lack of civilians prepared to deal knowledgeably with
defense and military issues in their countries. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense
William Perry proposed creating a regional center to address this problem during the
second Defense Ministerial held in Argentina in 1996. CHDS was formally
established in 1997 and operates as a university, in that it provides education and
encourages research and writing on Latin American security and defense issues. See
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University, Brief History
of CHDS, available at http://www.ndu.edu/chds/index.cfm?seclD=15&pageID=91&
lang=EN&type=section (last visited Oct.9, 2004).
79. See SINGER, supra note 1, at 132.
80. See id.
81. See SINGER, supra note 1, at 133.
82. See id.
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by Colombian officials." Apparently, MPRI failed to staff its
BogotA office with Spanish speaking personnel and failed to pro-
vide expertise applicable to a low-intensity conflict context."
MPRI was compensated for its services, however, and paid the
remaining balance of the $6 million contract.85
C. Northrop Grumman
Northrop Grumman characterizes itself as a "global defense
company[,]" which "provides technologically advanced, innovative
products, services and solutions in systems integration, defense
electronics, information technology, advanced aircraft, shipbuild-
ing, and space technology." 6 The company has 125,000 employ-
ees, operates in fifty states and twenty-five countries, and serves
the U.S. military and international military forces, as well as com-
mercial clients. 1
Providing services from the "Artic Circle to the tropics[,]"88
Northrop Grumman services worldwide military operations, U.S.
Army, Navy, and Air Force bases, as well as NASA facilities.89
The company has served as a lead contractor to the U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense for over thirty-five years. Additionally, Northrop
Grumman supports the development and maintenance of U.S.
Department of Defense weapons systems and operates remote-
controlled unmanned planes for the Air Force and Navy.90 This
military powerhouse proudly claims that it is capable of delivering
"unprecedented battlefield awareness" to "[w]arfighters."91
Northrop Grumman's involvement in the war on drugs is
indeed vast. Specifically, the company has provided military sup-
port services to the Colombian army in its operation of radar sites
to monitor drug trafficking.9 2 The Northrop Grumman operation
in Colombia, coined the 'Southcom Reconnaissance System,' is an
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. Northrop Grumman, About Us, available at http://www.northgrum.com/about-
us/aboutus.html (last visited Oct 11, 2004).
87. See id.
88. Northrop Grumman, Defense: From the Artic Circle to the Tropics, available at
http://www.it.northropgrumman.com/home.asp?bid=1523 (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. Northrop Grumman, Defense: The Power to Know, The Knowledge to Win,
available at http://www.it.northropgrumman.com/home.asp?bid=1522 (last visited
Feb. 21, 2005).
92. SINGER, supra note 1, at 207.
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$8.6 million contract,9 3 under which the company provides con-
tractors to fly drug crop spray planes. Under this contract, North-
rop Grumman and its subsidiary, California Microwave Systems,
are responsible for managing aircraft, pilots, and operators in
order "to counter illicit drug trafficking."94 The risk assessment to
these contractors is considered "moderate to high" due to the
nature of flights over dense jungle and treacherous terrain domi-
nated by Colombian rebels.95
D. Kellogg Brown & Root
Familiarly known as Brown & Root, or KBR, this private con-
tractor is a unit of Richard Cheney's former oil-services giant Hal-
liburton. The camaraderie between Halliburton and the Bush
Administration was a hotly debated topic during the 2004 Presi-
dential election. Previously, KBR was paid $141 million by the
Army to provide assistance to thousands of troops sent into Haiti
on a U.N. mission in 1994,96 and they were also awarded a $16
million contract to build the detention camps in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, that presently houses Al Qaeda prisoners.
Quite obviously, the aforementioned PMCs are engaged in a
vast and seemingly endless array of services for the U.S. govern-
ment. The responsibilities and capabilities of PMCs illustrate the
fact that private contractors have simply become an extension of
the United States military. DynCorp, MPRI, Northrop Grumman,
and KBR are only a sampling of the companies hired by the U.S.
government involved in counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency
missions in Latin America. 97 As the functions performed by civil-
93. Juan Forero, Private U.S. Operatives on Risky Missions in Colombia, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 14, 2004), available at http://www.sandline.com/hotlinks/NYTimes-
Private_o10AD845.html; See also Secretary of State, United States Department of
State, supra note 62.
94. Secretary of State, United States Department of State, supra note 62.
95. Id.
96. See Anthony Bianco et al., Special Report: Outsourcing War; An Inside Look at
Brown & Root, the Kingpin of America's New Military-Industrial Complex, Bus. WK.,
Sept. 15, 2004, available at 2003 WL 62195579.
97. Other private military companies awarded contracts in Latin America include:
Lockheed-Martin and ARINC, Inc., which were both awarded contracts to assist the
Colombian National Police; ARINC Engineering Services, LLC, which was awarded a
contract to support the Peruvian Air Force and Colombian Air Force; TRW, which was
awarded a contract to install and support radar data processing and voice
communications system; Matcom, which was awarded a contract to coordinate
activities between the U.S. and Colombia Air Force; Cambridge Communications,
which was awarded a contract to transport radar equipment; Virginia Electronic
Systems, which was awarded a contract to install equipment in boats purchased for
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ian contractors develop beyond the contours of their contract, lia-
bility is untraceable to the individual actor. This is only the first
link in a chain reaction of deniability and unaccountability.
IV. CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA'S
ESCALATION OF A PRIVATIZED OF WAR
An additional problem arises as the responsibilities of civilian
contractors increasingly call for participation closer to the battle-
field - their chances of becoming prime targets for enemy warfare
significantly increase. Despite the government's claims that civil-
ian contractors are not involved in combat, close scrutiny of the
tensions in Latin America suggest otherwise. Drug eradication
missions transpire in hostile environments where spray planes,
accompanied by helicopter gunships, are shot at from the ground
and are sometimes forced to land due to unrelenting ground fire.98
As the battle against narcotics and terrorism continues, the hostil-
ity and danger increase as guerillas adamantly defend the coca
crops.
In 2004, the United States General Accounting Office
reported that the number of ground-fire hits on spray aircraft
increased to a considerable degree in 2003, when the total number
for that year was more than 2001 and 2002 combined.99 Further-
more, a 2003 report issued by DynCorp noted that the increasing
threat to aircraft and pilots was causing concern regarding the
company's "safety and personnel morale."100
Morale concerns are an obvious consequence of repetitious
Colombia by the U.S. Department of Defense; Air Park Sales and Service, which was
awarded a contract to provide aircraft radio and equipment upgrades for the
Colombian Navy; Integrated AeroSystems, Inc., which was awarded a contract to
train the Colombian Air Force; Alion, LLC, which was awarded a contract to support
senior representatives of the Colombian Armed Forces; The Rendon Group, which was
awarded a contract to provide counter-drug public communications products; ACS
Defense and INS, which were both awarded contracts to provide support to the U.S.
Embassy; and Science Applications International Corp. and Mantech. See Secretary
of State, United States Department of State, supra note 62.
98. See United States Government Accountability Office, supra note 12.
99. See id. In 2002 and 2003, the number of ground-fire hits averaged more than
26 per month. This is a significant increase from 2001 to 2002 when the number of
ground-air hits averaged 10 per month. Additionally, the total number of hits in 2003
was more than the previous two years combined - 313 versus 288 in 2001 and 2002.
See id.; see also R. Norman Moody, Colombia's Drug Crops Taking Hit, FLORIDA
TODAY, July 11, 2004, at 1. Sharon Nell, Director of the Office of Aviation stated, "It's
a risky business... the airplanes took 380 gunfire hits from ground last year. Four
planes were lost." Id.
100. United States Government Accountability Office, supra note 12.
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attack, and it appears that the government's plan to deal with
these reports of increasing danger is to further increase military
and civilian presence in Colombia. This is indicated by continual
congressional approval of massive foreign aid budgets and person-
nel cap increases.
A. Congressionally Approved Budgets, 'Expanded
Authorities,' and the Evasion of Troop Caps
The escalating presence of U.S. forces and civilian contractors
in Latin America is signified by repeated Congressional budget
increases alone. In 2003, Congress approved Bush's budget
request of $731 million to be allotted towards counter-narcotics
assistance under the Andean Counterdrug Initiative ("ACI").1°1
Despite increased spending, Congress was insistent that "no
United States Armed Forces personnel or United States civilian
contractor employed by the United States will participate in any
combat operation."102 Only two months later, President Bush
requested additional funding as part of an 'Emergency Wartime
Supplemental' package to fight his global war on terrorism. This
request included counter-drug and military funding for Colom-
bia. °3 As a result, an additional $34 million was allocated by Con-
gress to .the ACI. 0 4
Most importantly, these budget appropriations included Con-
gress' approval of a provision coined as 'expanded authorities,'
whereby U.S. supplied training and equipment could be used not
only in counter-drug efforts, but in counter-terrorism efforts as
well.'0 5 The expanded authority implemented by Congress was an
101. See Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117
Stat. 11, 172-73 (2003). Congress approved $700 million to be provided to the Andean
Counterdrug Initiative ("ACI"). Congress further allowed an additional $31 million to
be transferred from the State Department's International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement account to ACI. See also Storrs & Veillette, supra note 14, at 28.
102. Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat.
11, 172-73 (2003).
103. See Storrs & Veillette, supra note 14, at 27-28.
104. See Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-11, 117 Stat. 559, 560, 577 (2003). Congress also approved an additional
reserve of $20 million in Foreign Military Financing ("FMF") which could be made
available to ACI for aircraft, training, and assistance to the Colombia Army. See id.;
see also Storrs & Veillette, supra note 14, at 28.
105. "[Flunds available to the Department of State for assistance to the
Government of Colombia shall be available to support a unified campaign against
narcotics trafficking, against activities by organizations designated as terrorist
organizations such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia ("FARC"), the
National Liberation Army ("ELN"), and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
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effort to further assist the Colombian government in its battle to
restore political and social order to the country.'
As a result of the expanded authorities provision, a quantity
of Black Hawk and Huey II helicopters were sent to Colombia to
be utilized for counter-narcotics operations, coca field eradication,
and lab destruction, as well as for Colombian force protection and
humanitarian assistance.107 Consequently, any belief that U.S.
ammunition, troops, and private contractors were restricted only
to fighting the drug war had just been effectively eradicated.
Included with the approval of expanded authorities however,
were "funding conditions and reporting requirements."0 8 In fact,
if at any time the U.S. Secretary of State determined that the
Colombian Army was not fulfilling its responsibility to restore
government authority, the expanded authorities would be
revoked. 9 The State Department was required to submit a report
to Congress that described the programs currently being executed
by private contractors to train Colombian nationals to assume the
responsibilities of contracted programs."'
Recently, Congress again approved the Foreign Operations
Appropriations bill which allotted $731 million to go towards the
ACI in 2005."l Yet again, the Senate reiterated the prohibition on
U.S. armed forces and civilian contractors "from participating in
any combat operation in connection with funds" provided in the
bill."2
("AUC"), and to take actions to protect human health and welfare in emergency
circumstances, including undertaking rescue operations." Consolidated
Appropriations Resolution of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 11, 172-73 (2003).
106. See Storrs & Veillette, supra note 14, at 28. As explained by Storrs, the
expanded 'authorities' provision was justified by the Committee as a means to
"provide more effective intelligence by gathering and fusion." It was not, as clarified
by the Committee, a "signal for the U.S. to become more deeply involved in assisting
the Colombian military in fighting its terrorists groups . . . ." Id.
107. See Marcella, supra note 15, at 41.
108. Storrs & Veillette, supra note 14, at 29.
109. "This authority shall cease to be effective if the Secretary of State has credible
evidence that the Colombian Armed Forces are not conducting vigorous operations to
restore government authority and respect for human rights in areas under the
effective control of paramilitary and guerilla organizations." Consolidated
Appropriations Resolution of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 11, 172-73 (2003).
110. See Storrs & Veillette, supra note 14, at 30.
111. See H.R. 4818, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2812, 108th Cong. (2004). See also
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809 (2004).
112. For information regarding the 2005 Foreign Operations appropriations bills
aid request, as well as the Senate and House Appropriations Committee reports, visit
the website of the Center for International Policy's Colombia Program at http:ll
www.ciponline.orgcolombia/05forops.htm. See also S. 2812, 108th Cong. (2004).
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Despite huge budget approvals to further U.S. presence in
Latin America, it is obvious from the aforementioned Congres-
sional requirements that the legislature was concerned U.S. pres-
ence could quickly escalate out of control. In fact, it has been
stated by analysts and advocates alike that additional U.S.
"involvement in Colombia could lead to a Vietnam-like
quagmire."113
Congress' concern over this escalation is indeed plausible. In
order to deter the intensification of civilian and military presence
in Colombia, personnel caps were implemented by Congress as a
safeguard against the escalation of America's involvement in
Latin America in 2000. At first, Congress implemented caps of
500 military personnel and 300 civilian contractors who could be
assigned to duty in Colombia at one time.1 4 Obviously, these per-
sonnel caps were put in place by certain members of Congress who
were concerned over the seemingly endless military commitments
of the United States in Colombia."5 Simply stated, members of
Congress saw a dangerous amount of "'growth potential[.]""' 6
Until a few months ago, the caps had been maintained at 400
troop and civilian personnel each. However, U.S. presence in
Colombia has quietly increased. Reports released by the White
House indicated that U.S. military personnel tripled from Novem-
ber 2001 to May 2003 when there were 358 military personnel and
308 civilian contractors present in Colombia." 7
Additionally, as a result of President Uribe's 'Plan Patriota,'
the most recent, large-scale counter-insurgency offensive to con-
tinue Colombia's war against the guerilla groups, contractor pres-
ence recently grew to exceed the mandated cap of 400 civilian
personnel." 8 In March 2004, President Uribe requested that the
113. Juan Forero, Congress Approves Doubling U.S. Troops in Colombia to 800, N.
Y. Times, Oct. 11, 2004, at A9. "Lifting the Congressionally mandated limits on
troops and contractors, a little-noticed measure in the 5,000-page Pentagon
authorization bill, is seen by some political analysts and rights advocates as a major
step toward even larger American troop commitments ... [In 2000 ... [,] members of
Congress hotly debated whether involvement in Colombia could lead to a Vietnam-
like quagmire." Id.
114. See Military Construction Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-246,
§ 3204(b)(1)(A)-(B), 114 Stat. 511 (2000).
115. See Memorandum from Adam Isacson, Center for International Policy, to
Interested Colleagues, Preserve the "Cap" on the U.S. Military Presence in Columbia
(Mar. 16, 2004), available at http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/040322cap.pdf.
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. See Adam Isacson et al., Blurring the Lines, Trends in U.S. Military Programs
with Latin America 6 (2004) (this work is a joint publication from the Latin America
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United States lift its "cap on the number of U.S. service members
and contractors in Colombia."119 The Bush Administration agreed
and requested that Congress increase the cap. As a result, in May
2004, Congress raised only the military troop cap from 400 to 500,
300 short of Bush's request of 800.
Only four months later, in September 2004, the Bush Admin-
istration requested yet another troop cap increase. As a result,
debates between the Senate and the House erupted, which
depicted the growing concern of Congress' members over the
expanding presence of U.S. troops and contractors in Colombia.
Interestingly, the House and Senate appear deeply divided over
this issue. The House of Representatives wanted to maintain the
current caps of 500 military personnel and 400 civilian contrac-
tors.12 ' However, the Senate approved of the cap increase to 800
military personnel and 600 civilian contractors. 12' On October 8,
2004, the final troop cap number was determined by a House-Sen-
ate Conference Committee. 22 The final legislation grants the
Bush Administration its full request of 800 military personnel and
600 civilian contractors. 123
It is interesting to note that the troop caps implemented by
Congress do not apply to all personnel stationed in Colombia. The
cap does not apply to civilian contractors who provide training and
support to safeguard Colombia's major petroleum pipeline, Cano
Lim6n Covenas, which has received the brunt of repeated attacks
by FARC and ELN.124 Neither does the cap apply to U.S. person-
Working Group Education Fund, the Center for International Policy, and the
Washington Office on Latin America), available at http://ciponline.org/facts/
0410btl.htm.
119. Jim Garamone, United States, Colombia Seek to Reinforce Success, AMERICAN
FORCES PRESS SERV. (Apr. 1, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Apr2004In04012004_200404018.html.
120. See The Center for International Policy's Colombia Program, U.S. Military
and Police Aid - 2004: The "Troop Cap" Debate, available at http://www.ciponline.org/
colombia/04cap.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). Interestingly, the House of
Representatives excluded any language regarding troop cap limits in the House
version of the September 2004 Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill.
Representative Sam Farr of California introduced and later withdrew an amendment
what would have limited an increase in the number of troops and civilian contractors.
This amendment was hotly debated by the House of Representatives. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id. The legislation was signed into law shortly thereafter on October 28,
2004. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. Law No.
108-375, § 1021(c)(1)-(2), 118 Stat. 1811 (2004).
124. See Storrs & Veillette, supra note 14, at 4. The Cano Lim6n Covenas oil
pipeline is operated by U.S. based Occidental. See also Thomas C. Bruneau,
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nel assigned as part of their regular duties to the U.S. Embassy,
nor to personnel sent on search and rescue operations.12 5
Nevertheless, the troop cap is a functional device which
allows Congress to monitor the number of personnel sent to
Colombia by the Bush Administration. The cap is a prudent mea-
sure designed to prohibit U.S. involvement in Colombia from spi-
raling out of control. It is extremely important that the troop caps
are maintained. Unfortunately, as the caps increase, the primary
function of limiting the number of civilian contractors becomes
defunct. Consequently, the raised caps signify the escalating
involvement of contractors. Indeed, a "Vietnam-like quagmire" is
on the horizon.
In addition to maintenance of the troop cap, compliance with
the cap is crucial. General Hill, former Commander of the Army's
United States Southern Command ("Southcom"), reported that he
managed the cap on a "daily basis" in order to "rigorously remain
under the ceilings[.]" '26 As a result, General Hill explained, the
Army was forced to cancel or delay previously scheduled personnel
arrivals to Colombia, request aircraft personnel to reduce the size
of their crew, and cut back on training."'
However, General Hill's compliance is not alone adequate.
Fortunately, private military companies are required to report
their personnel numbers to the government as well. As reported
by DynCorp, from 2001 to 2004, the number of personnel the com-
pany employed in Colombia who were "directly involved" in aerial
eradication procedures increased from 179 to approximately
298.128 Despite this report provided by DynCorp, at one time it
was actually reported that DynCorp realistically employed
Colombia: Conflict and Civil-Military Relations, STRATEGIC INSIGHTS (Mar. 2003). "In
2001 the petroleum infrastructure suffered 170 attacks, costing the country $520
million. In the last 15 years oil pipelines have suffered 950 attacks by the ELN and
FARC." Id.
125. See Storrs & Veillette, supra note 14, at 4.
126. Fiscal Year 2005 National Defense Authorization Budget Request: Hearing
Before the House Armed Services Committee, 109th Cong. (Mar. 24, 2004) (testimony
of General James T. Hill, United States Army, Commander, United States Southern
Command), available at http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/040324hill.htm
127. See id.
128. United States Government Accountability Office, supra note 12. Additionally,
the number of DynCorp staff supporting the Office of Aviation at Patrick Air Force
Base in Florida increased from 159 to approximately 190, from 2001 to 2003.
DynCorp officials were unable to provide exact numbers of their staff who
participated in eradication program. See id. The author of this Comment would like
to note that this is only one PMC's personnel numbers reported during a time when
there were many PMCs working under U.S. government contract in Colombia.
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between 300 - 600 contractors in Colombia.'29
The inability to monitor the number of civilian contractors
employed by PMCs is detrimental to the mandated troop cap. The
lack of knowledge regarding exact personnel numbers may be the
result of the Department of State's failure to release a comprehen-
sive report containing the specifications of contracts awarded to
private companies.13 In 2001, the Department of State released a
'Fact Sheet' regarding civilian contractors supporting Plan Colom-
bia, however, the report only reiterated the caps implemented by
Congress in 2000, and merely stated that the caps are closely
monitored by the U.S. Embassy in Bogota.'3 ' Additionally, in
2003, the Department of State released a Report to Congress
regarding the contracts awarded to PMCs in Colombia, however,
it contains no information regarding the number of civilian con-
tractors sent under the terms of each contract."2
The inability of the government to closely supervise PMC
deployment of contractors is a troubling factor that contributes to
the diminution of public oversight over contractor activities. Even
more problematic are the reports that PMCs, specifically
DynCorp, find creative ways to evade the caps. For instance, after
Congress implemented the U.S. civilian contractor cap at 400,
DynCorp hired foreign nationals to do their work in Colombia,
thus circumventing Congressional authority.33  Additionally,
DynCorp ostensibly hires hundreds of non-military personnel who
are not counted under the cap. 3 4
In sum, it is apparent that the military caps implemented by
Congress are neither monitored nor enforced. Accordingly, news
sources report that the military caps have "been far surpassed"
129. See SINGER, supra note 1, at 208. See also Neve Gordon, Strategic Violations:
The Outsourcing of Human Rights Abuses, 63 THE HUMANIST 10 (Sept. 1, 2003).
"While Congress capped the number of U.S. soldiers who could be sent to Colombia at
five hundred, the Pentagon[,] together with the Colombian government[,] ha[s] been
employing additional corporate soldiers from DynCorp to carry out anti-drug
operations." Id.
130. See SINGER, supra note 1, at 207.
131. See Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, United States Department of
State, Fact Sheet, Civilian Contractors and U.S. Military Personnel Supporting Plan
Colombia (May 15, 2001), available at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2001/3509
pdf.htm.
132. See generally Secretary of State, United States Department of State, supra
note 62.
133. See Nicholas von Hoffman, Contract Killers, HARPER'S MAG., June 1, 2004,
available at 2004 WL 56976086.
134. See id.
338
2005] CONTRACTORS IN LATIN AMERICA
and that in reality, there are "around 2000 U.S. mercenaries "135
present in Colombia. In theory, the troop caps implemented by
Congress merely represent a concerted effort to curtail U.S.
involvement in Latin America. The personnel caps today, how-
ever, act only as a symbol of cautious measures, rather than an
enforceable policy. Even if the caps are realistically enforced by
both government employees and civilian contractors, the underly-
ing policy - to restrict U.S. presence in Latin America - is rendered
useless if Congress continually increases the caps at the request of
the White House.
It has been recognized by a number of sources that an
increase in personnel inevitably leads to an expansion of military
commitments, referred to as "'Mission Creep[."""3 The threat of
Mission Creep mirrors the eerie prediction of Colombia becoming
a "Vietnam-like quagmire." These threats are further enhanced
by allegations that the risks and ramifications of American secur-
ity policies in the Andean Region have not fully been disclosed to
Congress by the current administration. Thus, it may be an unin-
formed Congress that continues to increase American military
presence in the seemingly endless battle against drugs in the jun-
gles of Colombia."3 7 An increase in personnel, whether accounted
for or not, inevitably leads to oversight. Obviously, the govern-
ment can no longer turn a blind eye to the consequences of troop
cap increases, or continue to ignore troop cap evasion practices.
135. Constanza Vieria, 17,000 Troops With U.S. Aid Launch Drive Against Rebels,
INTER PRESS SERVICE/GLOBAL INFORMATION NETWORK (June 29, 2004), available at
http://www.ips.org/.
136. "Now we're being asked to double the number of our soldiers, boots on the
ground, in Colombia. There is a term for what is happening in Colombia: It's called
'Mission Creep.'" Limiting U.S. Troops in Columbia - The Farr Amendment: Hearing
Before the House of Representatives, 108th Cong. (July 15, 2004) (statement by
Massachusetts Representative James P. McGovern), available at http://www.house.
gov/mcgovernlfloor07l504farr.htm; See also World Organization on Latin America,
Plan Colombia Report Card (grading 'Avoid Mission Creep' with an 'F'), available at
http://www.wola.org/Colombia/plan-col-reportcard03.pdf (last visited Nov. 16,
2004).
137. See Peter W. Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military
Firms and International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT L L., 521, 539. "[U]nder
current U.S. law, as long as the contract amount is under US $50 million, any U.S.
military firm can work abroad with or without notifying Congress." Id.; see also
Memorandum from Washington Office on Latin America to Foreign Policy and
Defense Policy Aides, supra note 49.
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B. Plausible Deniability - The Reduction of Public
Oversight
Perhaps more troubling than the continual increase in con-
tractor presence is the high level of secrecy regarding the range of
militaristic activities in which private contractors are involved.
Although government activities are by law open to examination by
the Freedom of Information Act, 138 private company contracts are
protected by proprietary law. 139 Internal company policies may
prohibit directors, employees, and agents from disclosing or using
confidential or proprietary information outside the company.
Therefore, most contracts between PMCs and the government pro-
vide non-disclosure agreements, and are deemed confidential by
both the contracting PMC as well as the Pentagon. 140 The confi-
dential nature of contracted work may perhaps constitute the
main reason behind the hiring of private contractors.
Obviously, this policy of accepted secrecy creates a breeding
ground for unanswered questions and misinformation. The ability
to 'contract out' jobs like spraying coca leaf, patrolling the skies,
and providing intelligence services provides the U.S. government
with "'plausible deniability[.]' 41 For instance, U.S. troops may be
legally prohibited by Congress from entering into combat in Latin
America, but PMC employees constitute civilians under U.S. con-
tract, and therefore, may not be bound by the same restrictions.
Due to the fact that private firms operating in Colombia under
U.S. government contract do not face the same constraints as the
military, the Bush Administration has been accused of utilizing
private contractors to further its political goals in order to circum-
vent Congressional scrutiny."4
138. The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2005). The Act provides that
"[elach agency shall make available to the public... descriptions of its central and
field organization . . . statements of the general course and method by which its
functions are channeled and determined.... ." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2005).
139. Peter W. Singer, Preface to PETER W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE
OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY, at x (2003).
140. See Joseph Giordono, Contractors Do More than Sling Troops' Chow, STARS
AN STRIPES (European ed.) (Mar. 10, 2003), available at http://www.stripes.com/
article.asp?section=104&article=12928&archive=true
141. The Center for Public Integrity, Colombia: Outsourcing War, available at
httpJ/www.publicintegrity.org/report.aspx?aid=261 (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
142. See Dangerous Work - Private Security Firms in Iraq, ECONOMIST, Apr. 10,
2004, available at WL 62017551. "The extensive PMF involvement in the war in
Colombia and its neighboring states by U.S.-based firms has been entirely without
Congressional notification, oversight, or approval." SINGER, supra note 1, at 209; see
also Avant, supra note 5. "Although the U.S. Congress approves the military budget,
its access to information about contracts is often limited. The president can use this
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From a legal perspective, outsourcing military projects can
serve as an effective measure to obfuscate the connection between
an act committed by a civilian contractor and the United States
government. Participation on the battlefield by a civilian contrac-
tor acts as an obscuration for the government, which, as a result,
appears to have no involvement. The lack of privity between the
government and an individual contractor, as well as between the
government and a host nation, is an obvious defense. Addition-
ally, the hiring of PMCs allows the government to avoid legislative
debate and deny control over outsourced military operations. In
fact, the only legislative debate regarding civilian contractors
seems to be over the implemented troop caps. Ostensibly, con-
gressional control begins and ends before contractors are even sta-
tioned on the battlefield.
Plausible deniability is further exemplified as contractors
take on more expansive roles than what is specified in their con-
tracts. The expansion of duties is illustrated by DynCorp's train-
ing and support responsibilities for the Colombian National
Police. As previously mentioned, the firm's contract with the gov-
ernment provides for contractors to engage in pilot training and
technical support to Colombian police units involved in drug crop
eradication. However, it has also been reported that DynCorp
employees are employed in aerial reconnaissance and combat."'
Specifically, contractors are reportedly engaged in fighting narco-
terrorists and Colombian guerillas.' DynCorp employees have in
fact, admitted to engaging in high risk operations. 145 It is obvious
that DynCorp's employees are involved in more dangerous mis-
sions than were initially anticipated by Congress.
An explanation for this is obviously the expanded authorities
provision approved by Congress, however, this combative activity
was first exemplified in February 2001, when a DynCorp team
was sent on a search and rescue mission to recover the crew of a
Colombian military helicopter downed by guerilla fire in Southern
Colombia. 146 The rescue team was protected by a DynCorp heli-
copter gunship which provided covering fire. 147 Apparently, this
advantage to evade restriction on U.S. actions, effectively limiting congressional
checks on foreign policy." Id.
143. See SINGER, supra note 1, at 208.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See SINGER, supra note 1, at 208; see also The Center for Public Integrity,
supra note 141.
147. See SINGER, supra note 1, at 208.
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incident resulted in the first "public revelation" that DynCorp had
four helicopter gunships at their disposal in Colombia, were
engaged in firing at rebels, and were, in fact, engaged in offensive
battle rather than merely crop spraying.
14
Despite these glaring incidents of battle, the Bush Adminis-
tration continues to deny that contractors are engaged in warfare.
During a 2003 White House press briefing, when repeatedly asked
if U.S. troops were engaged in battle with FARC in Colombia, the
White House was adamant in its stance that U.S. forces were uti-
lized only for support purposes in Colombia. 149 Similarly, when
questioned whether a reported 150 additional special forces had
been sent to Colombia, the White House claimed that the informa-
tion was false and was in fact the result of an inaccurate, "errone-
ous report."150 Interestingly, this "erroneous report" had been sent
from the President to Congress a week prior. 5 ' When pressed fur-
ther, the White House provided a vague response when asked
about the number of troops and type of troops (military or contrac-
tors) sent to Colombia.'52
Government officials deny the combative role that contractors
play in fighting narcoterrorism and insist on veiling the truth
behind U.S. participation as well.'53 For instance, in a September
2004 conference at Georgetown University, William B. Wood, U.S.
Ambassador to Colombia stated, "Neither U.S. military nor U.S.
contractors patrol with the Colombians or engage in activities that
148. See id. But see Fact Sheet, Civilian Contractors and U.S. Military Personnel
Supporting Plan Colombia, supra note 131. "On a typical mission, U.S. civilian
contractors accompany the spray operation in these helicopters as pilots and medics,
but not as gunners." Id.
149. In response to an inquiry whether US troops would be engaged in combat
missions against the FARC, Mr. Fleischer responded, "[Tihe United States is down
there in a position of providing assistance to the government of Colombia, which
Colombia is involved in the combat against the FARC. We are there to provide
assistance in counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism efforts." Press Briefing by Ari
Fleischer, White House Press Secretary (Feb. 24, 2003), available at httpJ/www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2003/02/print/20030224-5.html#7.
150. Id.
151. See id.; see also Press Gaggle with Ari Fleischer, White House Press Secretary,
supra note 53.
152. See Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer, White House Press Secretary, supra note
149. When questioned in what context the report was inaccurate, Mr. Fleischer
replied, "In both the nature of the forces and the number. It is a far, far smaller
number, and it's a varied type of DOD officials to go down there to assist Colombia in
ongoing counter-narcotics, counter-terrorist effort." Id.
153. "Approximately 25 U.S. citizen contractors provide training and logistical
support . . . but they do not fly in counternarcotics missions." Fact Sheet, Civilian
Contractors and U.S. Military Personnel Supporting Plan Colombia, supra note 131.
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might place them in a combat situation."15 4
Unsurprisingly, PMCs are also secretive about their partici-
pation in Latin America. When asked about the expanded role of
its contractors in fighting the war on drugs, DynCorp executives
generally decline to comment. Apparently, DynCorp employees
are bound by strict confidentiality agreements and are prohibited
from talking to media. Furthermore, when DynCorp employees
are killed in operations, DynCorp executives claim that the deaths
are the result of 'accidents' rather than military engagements. 155
It is important to note that the death of an American soldier in
this context would result in an investigation, with a report
released by the U.S. Embassy regarding the deceased's identity
and background information. Simply because a contractor is a
private civilian as opposed to a military recruit, the government is
not bound to concede responsibility or provide release information
regarding the incident. 5 '
The accepted oversight and deniability which the government
and PMCs share regarding the events in Colombia paint a grave
picture of the war on drugs. This deniability results in a total lack
of accountability, which in turn, has resulted in a war that has no
end in sight.
C. The Detrimental Affects of Profit Maximization
The consequence of plausible deniability as a result of a priva-
tized military becomes particularly troublesome as the goals
between contractors and the U.S. government diverge. An exam-
ple of this can be found in the cost-cutting practices of PMCs while
they are engaged in operations. For instance, MPRI, a company
publicly owned by shareholders, is undoubtedly concerned with its
bottom line under any contract it performs. When a contract
relies on warfare to profit, this is certainly problematic. Concerns
regarding profits and losses are certainly foreseeable as factors
altering the way a company handles business decisions. Unfortu-
nately, in a hostile environment, profit maximization may not
154. Ambassador William B. Wood, Remarks at Georgetown University, U.S.
Support for Colombia's National Strategy for Defense and Democratic Security (Sept.
20, 2004), available at http://usembassy.state.gov/posts/co1/wwwsww42.shtml
155. See SINGER, supra note 1, at 208.
156. See Representative Bob Barr, Increased Opium Output Could Blind-Side U.S.
(Nov. 6, 2003), available at http://bobbarr.org/default-print.asp?pt=newsdescr&RI=
463. When discussing the tragedy of civilian contractors killed in Colombia,
Representative Bob Barr eloquently recognized, "There's been no medals awarded to
these men; no TV movies canonizing them; hardly a ripple of concern expressed." Id.
343
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:2 & 3
result in the best political outcomes. In fact, divided goals and
loyalties between a PMC and the government are obvious issues
present in all of these contracts. A private contractor's loyalty to
his salary, or an executive's loyalty to the company's bottom line
will most certainly lead to inflated charges, over-billing, cost cut-
ting and worse, the furtherance of war.
An egregious example of the detrimental effects of cost cut-
ting as well as inflated billing can be found in DynCorp's employ-
ment of unqualified mechanics to repair spray aircraft.157 More
troubling are the statements of actual DynCorp employees
employed in the maintenance of spray aircraft in Colombia. These
employees claim that the amount of crashed aircraft results not
from reportedly heavy enemy fire, but instead is a consequence of
faulty maintenance work performed by unqualified DynCorp per-
sonnel. 15  Additionally, critics of the company claim that the loss
of aircraft is a result of the poor safety record of DynCorp due to
the company's utilization of non-standardized (i.e., cheaper) air-
craft that lack central computerized tracking systems.159
Reportedly, MPRI is guilty of these cost-cutting procedures as
well. Allegedly, MPRI hires chefs and former security guards to
maintain and repair their spray aircraft.1 6° This deplorable prac-
tice has purportedly resulted in a rather high amount of downed
aircraft in Colombia.161 Nevertheless, the company continues to
hire employees who may not necessarily meet contract require-
ments in order to bill the government a specified billing amount
set by the number of personnel required by its contract.'62
Unfortunately, tragic results of the cost cutting ploys under-
taken by various PMCs are obvious. Since 2000, approximately 40
U.S. aircraft have been lost in Colombia purportedly "due to poor
maintenance and inexperienced Colombian pilots." 63 Addition-
157. See SINGER, supra note 1, at 156.
158. See id. "As one DynCorp mechanic working on the contract writes, 'We have
people who are working on aircraft with absolutely no aviation experience nor
ground-equipment skills.'" Id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. Singer quotes a DynCorp employee as stating, "[tihe management here is
looking at the bottom line, and they surely do not seem to care what kind of person
works on the helicopters. I guess that makes good business sense, but to me not at
the cost our servicemen and women." Id.
162. See id.
163. Norman Ho, Failed Plan Colombia: U.S. Policy in Colombia in Misguided,
HARv. POL. REV. (Dec. 7, 2003), available at http://www.hpronline.org/news/2003/12/
07/World/Failed.Plan.Columbia-578467.shtml
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ally, although certainly not widely known, is the fact that the
United States has lost more aircraft in Colombia than during the
first Iraq war. 16
The aforementioned concerns regarding the United States'
role in the war on drugs are inexorably linked to each other. For
instance, troop cap evasion and the government's accepted igno-
rance of evasion procedures easily creates an environment where
contractor accountability is virtually impossible. This, in turn,
allows the government to claim deniability of contractor involve-
ment in warfare. Plausible deniability, combined with the life
threatening affects of profit maximization measures, inevitably
leads to inexcusable consequences.
D. Kidnapped! A Tragic Consequence of Cost Cutting
and a Glaring Example of Plausible Deniability
On February 13, 2003, a U.S. plane carrying four American
Northrop Grumman contractors on a surveillance and drug crop
fumigation mission for Southcom'6 crashed in the southern jun-
gles of Colombia in a zone dominated by FARC. 66 It is important
to note that as a result of the previously mentioned expanded
authorities provision, FARC announced that it would consider all
U.S. government operatives as military targets. 167 Hence, FARC
considers military personnel and civilian contractors as one and
the same.
Three American civilians were consequently abducted by
FARC and are still being held captive today, two years after their
capture. The three men have been cut off from society and live at
a FARC camp deep in the southern jungles of Colombia. FARC
granted a Colombian reporter an interview with the hostages in
164. See Representative Bob Barr, supra note 156.
165. The Army's United States Southern Command ("Southcom") is the lead
Department of Defense agent responsible for assisting the Colombian government in
its battle against 'narcoterrorism.' Southcom supports the Colombian government in
its implementation of military aspects of the Andean Regional Initiative.
Consequently, Southcom trains pilots, operates aircraft and provides counter-drug
intelligence support to Colombian troops. In 2003, Southcom contracted the
construction and implementation of logistics support centers and maintenance
facilities in Colombia, as well as the maintenance of the Colombian Army's helicopter
fleet to various private military companies. See Hearing before the House Committee
on Government Reform, 108th Cong., at 2-17 (June 17, 2004) (written statement of
General James T. Hill, United States Army, Commander, United States Southern
Command), available at http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFilesSOUTHCOM%20-%
20General%20Hill%20Testimony.pdf.
166. United States Institute of Peace, supra note 34, at 2.
167. Id.
345
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:2 & 3
order to prove that the Americans were still alive."
The American hostages are Marc Gonsalves, Keith Stansell,
and Thomas Howes. 169 According to the three men, their plane
crashed as a result of engine failure, and the pilot, Tom Janis, also
a civilian contractor, was forced to land in a field in South Colom-
bia. 170 The plane carried four American contractors and only one
Colombian. 171
A White House press briefing was held to address dual con-
cerns about the kidnapping and a report allegedly released by the
White House concerning personnel deployment to Colombia. 72
Despite the White House's acknowledgment that the hostages
were private industry contractors, questions regarding whether
additional forces had been sent to Colombia were deflected. 73
A tactic frequently utilized by FARC is kidnapping for ran-
som, which aids in funding the organization's terrorist activities.
FARC also uses hostages as bargaining tools to negotiate the
release of its members from Colombian prisons. FARC is holding
these three American contractors, as well as soldiers, officers, and
politicians to demand a prisoner exchange for FARC rebels held in
Colombian jails. Simply stated, the contractors' lives, if in fact
they are still alive, depend on a prisoner exchange. The United
States however, refuses to negotiate with FARC due to the gue-
rilla group's classification as a terrorist organization. Repeated
requests by the contractors' families to Northrop Grumman and
the State Department to facilitate the release of the contractors
seem to fall on deaf ears. Apparently, the only effort made to facil-
168. See HELD HOSTAGE IN COLOMBIA (Urcunina Films 2003). The Colombian
journalist, Jorge Enrique Botero filmed the interview on July 25, 2003 and
subsequently produced a documentary film.
169. See Robert Charles, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, Colombian Terrorists, WASH. TIMEs (Aug. 25, 2004), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/rm/35711.htm. See also HELD HOSTAGE IN COLOMBIA,
supra note 168.
170. HELD HOSTAGE IN COLOMBIA, supra note 168.
171. See id. During the interview, the American contractors further explained that
the Colombian military officer and American pilot Tom Janis were killed by FARC
rebels.
172. See Press Gaggle with Ari Fleischedr, White House Press Secretary, supra note
53.
173. See id. When asked whether a letter from the President to Congress reflected
the number of personnel deployed in Colombia, Ari Fleischer stated, "On the
numbers, you need to talk to DOD about it, anything dealing with the specific
numbers. What I'm indicating to you is we have, and we will, continue to work closely
with Colombia and its government and its military and its police on how to combat
the FARC... So I'm trying to give you some body language that I'm not going to get
into numbers." Id.
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itate the contractors' return is a $5 million reward for the individ-
uals responsible for the kidnapping.17 4
Horrifically, an additional three Northrop Grumman employ-
ees were killed in a plane crash while on a rescue mission search-
ing for Gonsalves, Howes, and Stansell.7 5 The families of these
deceased men, incensed that their efforts to get details pertaining
to the deaths have been met by delay tactics and red tape, have
filed a lawsuit against the Department of Defense and Northrop
Grumman. 1 7  These lawsuits are currently pending in a Georgia
district court.1 1 7 The complaint alleges that the United States
"privatizes" dangerous missions, thereby placing contractors
directly on the front lines of the drug war "for no reason other
than to save a few dollars."17 The complaint further describes the
treacherous terrain that surveillance and spray planes fly over
and the obvious need for aircraft that can support the weight of
heavy surveillance equipment, as well as the pilot and crew mem-
bers on board.179 The complaint alleges that Northrop Grumman
acquired a salvaged, single engine aircraft that was less costly to
maintain than a twin engine aircraft, despite the fact that a twin
engine plane would have offered "significantly improved power to
meet the demands of mountainous terrain."'"8 Additionally, the
complaint alleges that Northrop Grumman executives, as well as
Department of Defense officials, were made aware of the plane's
deficiencies.81" Despite this, a second single engine plane was pur-
chased. Both planes were sent to Colombia, but were "frequently
grounded due to mechanical or other problems."8 2 The complaint
174. See Ambassador William B. Wood, Announcement on the Rewards for Justice
Program (Dec. 4, 2003), available at http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/englisgt
actsof terror/Colombianhostages.cfm.
175. See Loretta Waldman, A Woman's Bold Move to Try to Free Her Son,
HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 13, 2004, at Al. The three men killed on the search and
rescue mission were Tommy Schmidt, Ralph Ponticelli and James Oliver. See id.; see
also HELD HOSTAGE IN COLOMBIA, supra note 168.
176. See Waldman, supra note 175; see also John McQuaid, Families of Four Men
Killed In Colombian Crashes Sue, TIMES PICAYUNE, May 21, 2004, available at http:ll
www.nola.com/.
177. Plaintifffs Amended Complaint for Damages and Demand for Trial by Jury,
Oliver v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, No. 3:04-CV-041-JTC (D. Ga. filed Apr. 6, 2004).
178. Id. at 2. "Little known to the public is the fact that the United States, through
the Department of Defense, has attempted to 'privatize' these missions, placing those
men who are at the front lines of this 'War' in grave and unacceptable danger for no
reason other than to save a few dollars." Id.
179. See id. at 3.
180. Id.
181. See id. at 4.
182. Id.
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goes on to describe various disputes that occurred between spray
plane pilots and Northrop Grumman executives regarding deri-
sory safety precautions and inadequate, underpowered, cheap air-
craft, as well as the placement of inexperienced pilots with little
aviation experience into dangerous situations with little to no
training.
Obviously, the cost cutting procedures exercised by Northrop
Grumman resulted in the purchase of salvaged, contemptible air-
craft that were not capable of handling the specified mission.
Hence, concern over profits by Northrop Grumman resulted in the
kidnapping and murders of seven of its civilian contractors.
Perhaps even more troubling are the repercussions which fol-
lowed this tragic event regarding the liability of Northrop Grum-
man and the U.S. government. Interestingly, soon after both
plane crashes, the contracts that all of these civilian contractors
were working under, as employees of the Northrop Grumman sub-
sidiary, California Microwave Systems, were transferred to a
newly created company, CIAO, Inc.l1 3 The complaint alleges that
an agent of Northrop Grumman "removed all evidence of Oliver's
employment" when he went through private papers belonging to
the pilot and destroyed documents pertaining to his contract and
employment with Northrop Grumman." According to former
pilots and a high-ranking official experienced in working with con-
tractors in Colombia, the underlying rationale of this contract
switch was to shield Northrop Grumman from liability. 8 ' Unfor-
tunately, this contract switch seems to have shielded Northrop
Grumman temporarily. While the families' cases are pending in
court, Northrop Grumman, as well as Atlanta Air Salvage, the sal-
vage company which provided the spray planes, "collected millions
of dollars in insurance recovery" for the lost planes after their
insurer was permitted to inspect the crash site. 86 The families
claim that they were never permitted to view the crash site.18
7
The complaint sets forth claims of negligence, gross negli-
gence, and willful and wanton conduct on the part of Northrop
Grumman and the U.S. Department of Defense, as well as wrong-
ful death and breach of contract claims.' Experts say that while
183. Forero, Private U.S. Operatives on Risky Missions in Columbia, supra note 93.
184. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint for Damages and Demand for Trial by Jury,
Oliver v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, No. 3:04-CV-041-JTC, at 8 (D. Ga. filed Apr. 6, 2004).
185. See id. at 7-8.
186. Id. at 8.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 22-34.
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only a few lawsuits of this type have been filed against PMCs, the
escalating employ of private contractors is sure to result in litiga-
tion.i"9 As of now, however, the quandary regarding contract lia-
bility claims of contractors and their family members raises
substantial issues. A lawsuit such as this one may serve to pro-
vide answers and "shake loose"19° pertinent information that will
begin to depict the true nature of the responsibilities handled by
PMCs. Simply stated, this lawsuit represents a positive start to
rectifying the dangers intrinsically present in PMC contracts. In
fact, a predominant issue underlying this lawsuit, which is inher-
ently present in all relations between private contractors and the
government, is expressed in the complaint in a single sentence:
"by using private contractors ... the Department of Defense can
attempt to avoid political repercussions for inappropriate, unsafe
or unwarranted activities."191
Not surprisingly, interviews with the kidnapped contractors'
families depict frustration and anguish. Marc. Gonsalves' wife
stated, "[Northrop Grumman executives and the U.S. Department
of State] tell me ... they're doing everything in their power, but
everything seems to be a secret."'92 Additionally, Jo Rosano,
mother of Marc Gonsalves stated, "[the contractors] are fighting a
war... the Bush Administration doesn't want to appreciate the
fact that they are doing this dirty job for the country. If they were
in the military, it would be a different story."193
In August 2004, Ms. Rosano, frustrated by the lack of involve-
ment of the United States, initiated her own talks with President
Uribe, requesting him to negotiate the release of her son.9 4 Ms.
Rosano has repeatedly accused the U.S. government of aban-
doning the three civilian hostages.'95 Ms. Rosano's efforts in
Colombia seem to have had some effect. Uribe first made a pris-
oner exchange offer with the FARC in August, but the discussions
were unsuccessful. On November 1, 2004, however, it was
reported that FARC unexpectedly released four hostages who
189. See McQuaid, supra note 176.
190. Id.
191. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint for Damages and Demand for Trial by Jury,
Oliver v. U.S. Dept. of Defense, No. 3:04-CV-041-JTC, at 13 (D. Ga. filed Apr. 6, 2004).
192. HELD HOSTAGE IN COLOMBIA, supra note 168.
193. Id.
194. Ms. Rosano stated, "The United States government is not doing anything."
Reuters, Mother of U.S. Contractor Pleads For Son's Freedom From Colombian
Rebels, FRONTRUNNER, Aug. 18, 2004.
195. See Hostage's Mom Says U.S. Abandoning Son, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 13, 2004, at
10.
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were held by the guerilla organization for over three years.196
Apparently, this prisoner release followed Uribe's proposal for a
prisoner exchange the week prior. The four hostages released,
however, were not the American civilian contractors.
The kidnapping of civilian contractors raises noticeable ques-
tions regarding the role of the government in their search and res-
cue. Bob Barr, former United States Congressman, recognized
that there is a "noticeable difference" between the way the govern-
ment has responded to military personnel taken as prisoners in
Iraq and civilian contractors kidnapped in Colombia.197 For
instance, despite the government's 'concern' that civilian contrac-
tors will not receive Prisoner of War ("POW") status if captured by
enemy forces, when FARC did, in fact, grant these three Ameri-
cans POW status, the U.S. government officially designated the
men as "kidnapees[."' 198
Certainly, questions remain regarding the liability of the
civilian contractors' employer, as well as the U.S. government, in
the contexts of civilian captivity and deaths. In regard to deaths
of civilian contractors on the battlefield, the dependents of con-
tract employees are not afforded the same answerability as rela-
tives of U.S. troops.199 In fact, the death toll among private
contractors has been described as "anyone's guess[.]"2 °° Under
most contracts, the PMC is responsible for notifying families of
grave circumstances, but unfortunately, this responsibility is han-
dled deficiently by some companies.20' Simply stated, if the gov-
ernment is going to rely on civilian contractors to fight its wars, it
must make itself liable to their dependents. Foreseeable as it is
that the government will continually refuse this role, procedures
must be implemented and enforced to define the liabilities of
PMCs to its civilian employees and their families.
196. See Colombia: FARC Frees Four Unexpectedly, United Press Int'l (Nov. 1,
2004), available at http://www.miami.com/mid/miamiherald/news/world/americas/
10066294.htm?lc
197. HELD HOSTAGE IN COLOMBIA, supra note 168.
198. Avant, supra note 5.
199. See Center for Public Integrity, Colombia: Outsourcing War, available at
http://www.publicintegrity.org/report.aspx?aid=261&sid=l1O>%20&sid=l00 (last
visited Mar. 10, 2005).
200. von Hoffman, supra note 133.
201. See Interview by Multinational Monitor with Peter W. Singer, supra note 2.
Singer stated, "Some companies have a great reputation for treating the employees
families well if something goes wrong; and some of them do a quite terrible job and try
to avoid any of the costs." Id. Subsequently, Singer provided the dissolution of
California Microwave Systems into CIAO, Inc as an example of a PMC trying to avoid
the costs of the three contractors held hostage. See id.
350
2005] CONTRACTORS IN LATIN AMERICA
V. CONCLUSION
As the distinctions between terrorists, rebels, guerillas and
drug-traffickers are blurred, and the current Administration con-
tinues its battle in the inexorably linked wars of drugs and terror-
ism, it seems an obvious consequence that the roles played by
military soldiers, mercenaries, and civilian contractors will be dis-
torted as well. It is imperative to acknowledge the fact that the
private military sector is here to stay. Civilian contractors are not
only hired by the United States, and contractor operations are not
confined to Latin America. Contracting civilian contractors is a
global phenomenon. For example, PMCs are heavily involved in
the Middle East and Africa, and are also contracted by the United
Nations "for logistics, transportation, and demining operations."2"2
As information regarding the contracted missions of PMCs is
disseminated and consequently understood (an attempted goal
underlying the research articulated in this article), regulations
need to be implemented to ensure that proper procedures specific
to civilian contractors are followed. The onus here is on civilian
contractors as well as the current Administration, the Depart-
ment of Defense, and Southcom, which as previously mentioned,
supports the Colombian government in its implementation of mili-
tary aspects of the ARI. Every one of these organizations must
follow guidelines, specifically the troop cap policy implemented by
Congress.
The kidnapping and deaths of civilian contractors described
in this Comment are the most recent example of the tragic conse-
quences of non-compliance and unaccountability. It is important
to realize that events similar to the one described in this Com-
ment have been occurring for years. A particularly prime example
occurred in April 2001, when a private plane flying over Peru was
shot down after Peruvian military officials, working with U.S.
support, identified it as a possible drug trafficking flight.2 °3 Unfor-
tunately, the plane was carrying American missionaries who were
killed in the crash.204 In this particularly tragic incident, the 'U.S.
support' was in fact a contracted surveillance crew, comprised of
202. Garrett Mason, UN Peacekeeping and the Private Sector, IPOA QUARTERLY 1
(Oct. 5, 2004), available at http://www.ipoaonline.org/content/IPOANewsletterOct
2004.pdf
203. See Storrs & Veillette, supra note 14, at 14.
204. See id. As a result of this incident, the House Foreign Operations
Appropriations Subcommittee, in its report of the FY 2004 Foreign Operations
Appropriations bill, denied support to the Peruvian air interdiction program until
safeguards were implemented. See id. at 29.
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Aviation Development Corporation employees, a PMC contracted
by the CIA.20 5
It is also important to note that Latin America represents
only a faction of accountability issues regarding PMC contractors.
Additional incidents of error, as well as palpable breaches of duty
and security have occurred in Bosnia and Iraq where the PMC
business is thriving. A prime example of contractor abuse
occurred in Iraq at the now infamous Abu Ghraib prison, where
contractors acted as interrogators and translators.0 6 An addi-
tional recent example of contractor recklessness occurred last
August, when a DynCorp contractor "flew a suitcase full of lethal
explosives aboard an airliner from the Middle East" to JFK air-
port in New York. °7
Obviously, accountability issues are prevalent wherever civil-
ian contractors are employed. The consequences of unac-
countability and diminished oversight constitute global threats.
The current situation in Colombia represents a prime example of
where these issues can be and need to be corrected.
The International Peace Operations Association ("IPOA") is
attempting to instill a sense of order among private contractors.
Members of the IPOA must pledge to follow a code of conduct and
relevant international laws of human rights, as well as accept
accountability for their actions.20 Additionally, the Federal Acqui-
sition Regulations govern contracts between the Department of
Defense and PMCs. 20 9 However, the answerability created by
these regulations is simply not enough.
The most obvious solution to the privatization and 'corpora-
tization' of war is simply, accountability. As global wars continue
to be waged, the employment of civilian contractors will flourish,
and consequently, issues of negligence and liability will prolifer-
205. See SINGER, supra note 1, at 15.
206. See Avant, supra note 5.
207. John Marzulli, JFK Airport Police Freed Lethal-Luggage Owner After Flight
from Middle East, DAILY NEWS, Sept. 15, 2004, available at 2004 WL 55644370.
208. See generally International Peace Operations Association ("IPOA"), IPOA Code
of Conduct, available at http://www.ipoaonline.org/code.htm (last visited Mar. 22,
2004).
209. The Federal Acquisition Regulations System was established "for the
codification and publication of uniform policies and procedures for acquisition by all
executive agencies." 48 C.F.R. §1.101 (2004). The Federal Acquisition Regulations
System consists of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) which is the primary
regulation used by Federal Executive agencies in their acquisition of supplies and
services with appropriated funds. FAR provides guidelines for business conducted
between the government and contractors. See id.
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ate. The war on drugs in Latin America represents a prime exam-
ple of this proposition. Plausible deniability and accepted
oversight can no longer be tolerated.
